This paper contributes to the debate on the use of temporary controls on capital outflows as a crisis resolution measure by examining the outcome of Malaysia's radical response to the 1997-98 financial crisis. The analysis suggests that carefully designed temporary capital controls were successful in providing Malaysian policymakers a viable setting for aiding the recovery process through the standard Keynesian therapy. Capital controls also assisted banking and corporate restructuring by facilitating the mobilization of domestic resources, and more importantly, by providing a cushion against possible adverse impacts on market sentiment of "national" initiatives. Of course other countries should be cautious in deriving policy lessons from Malaysia because a number of factors specific to Malaysia seem to have significantly conditioned the outcome of the capital-control based recovery package.
Introduction
Malaysia made headlines in the context of the Asian ªnancial crisis by taking an unorthodox (and risky) policy posture whose key elements were capital controls and expansionary macroeconomic policy. Following this policy choice, which marked a signiªcant departure from the IMF-centered approach adopted by the other crisis-hit countries in the region, the Malaysian economy recovered smoothly, defying widespread pessimism that prevailed in economic circles at the time. There is, however, an intense debate on whether this episode holds lessons for using capital controls as a tool of crisis resolution. One can distinguish three alternative views. The ªrst view is that this was a case of "locking the stable door after the horse has bolted." At the time Malaysia made the policy U-turn, capital had already left the country and speculative pressure for capital outºow from the Asian region was coming to an end. The second view holds that capital controls did play a pivotal role in the recovery by insulating the domestic capital market from the world capital market (with respect to short-term ºows) and thus allowing the Malaysian government to engage in ªscal and monetary expansion, and restructuring troubled banks and companies. The third view is that the capital controls, assuming that they did succeed in engineering recovery, would have seriously damaged long-term growth prospects of the economy, in particular by discouraging new investment and impeding capital market access. This paper contributes to this debate by systematically evaluating these views, paying due attention to economic and sociopolitical circumstance behind Malaysia's radical policy posture and the role played by capital controls in the recovery process. To gain perspective, the Malaysian experience is compared and contrasted with the experiences of Thailand and South Korea (henceforth referred to as Korea) under IMF-supported reform programs, while giving due attention to potentially important inter-country differences relating to the economic structure and the policy context. 1 Malaysia's radical policy choice is the ªrst case in the post-war economic history of an emerging market economy temporarily reversing the cause of capital account opening in a crisis context. It deserves attention given the new-found interest, following the spate of ªnancial crises in emerging market economies in the 1990s, in temporary controls on capital outºows as a crisis resolution measure (Cooper 1999; King 1999; Krugman 1999; Corden 2003) .
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of capital account liberalization during the pre-crisis era, and examines patterns of capital ºows in the run-up to the crisis, focusing on the interplay of international capital mobility with the domestic macroeconomic policy and regulatory regime in determining the country's vulnerability to a crisis. Section 3 examines Malaysia's initial policy response to the crisis and the economic collapse. Section 4 discusses the radical policy shift, highlighting the political and institutional underpinnings and the nature of the policy package built around capital controls. Section 5 looks at the recovery process under the new policy orientation. Section 6 probes the role of capital controls in the recovery process. The ªnal section draws inferences and policy lessons. To assist the reader in following the unfolding events, a comprehensive chronology of ªnancial, economic, and political events surrounding the crisis is provided in Appendix 1.
Capital account liberalization, capital inºows, and signs of vulnerability

Policy trends
Malaysia is unique among developing countries for its long-standing commitment to an open foreign trade regime. Malaysia achieved Article VIII status (for current account convertibility) under the IMF Articles of Agreement on 11 November 1968, becoming the fourth Asian economy to do so after Hong Kong, China (15 February 1961) ; Japan (1 April 1964); and Singapore (9 November 1968). 2 A natural companion to its outward-oriented trade policy was a ªrm commitment to the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI approval procedures and restrictions on foreign equity ownership were liberal in the 1950s at a time when hostility toward multinationals was the order of the day in the developing world. The emphasis on FDI promotion received added impetus with a notable shift in development policy toward export-oriented industrialization in the early 1970s. At that time, legislation provided for the establishment of special export processing zones, allowing 100 percent foreign ownership and exemption from general labor legislation, including employment quotas for bumiputras (ethnic Malays) for export-oriented investors.
The Malaysian policy regime relating to non-FDI capital ºows (that is, international ºows of purely ªnancial capital), too, in general remained liberal throughout the post-war period, compared to most other developing countries (Yusof et al. 1994; Williamson and Mahar 1998) . However, liberalization in this sphere was much more cautious and gradual by Malaysia's own historical record of trade and FDI liberalization. Until about the late 1970s, there were binding restrictions on short-term overseas investment by residents-placing deposits abroad, lending to non-residents, purchasing immobile properties, or investing in foreign equity.
the growth of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) as an independent entity, the government announced on 27 October 1998 the delisting (in effect from 2 January 1990) of Malaysian registered companies from the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES). This split from SES intended to set the stage for developing the KLSE as an independent exchange, to attract international investors in competition with SES. The early 1990s saw a number of initiatives to further liberalization of impediments to portfolio capital inºow to promote the trading on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange with increased participation of institutional investors. In 1992, the Securities Act was passed to enable the establishment of a new Securities Commission (SC) to take over share market monitoring and supervision, previously undertaken by the Capital Investment Committee under the jurisdiction of Bank Negara Malaysia. This initiative gave further impetus to stock market growth under a more ºexible operational framework. In the same year, the ceiling on foreign share holding of local brokerage ªrms was lifted from 30 percent to 49 percent. Tax rates for both foreign and local fund managers were reduced from 30 percent to 10 percent.
The Federal Territory of Labuan was inaugurated as an International Offshore Financial Center on 1 October 1990 as part of the government's long-term plan to enhance the attractiveness of Kuala Lumpur as a regional ªnancial center. It was envisaged that, with the Asia-Paciªc Region emerging as the fastest growing region in the world, Labuan would play a key role in enhancing the attractiveness of Malaysia as a world investment center. Licensed offshore banks, offshore insurance entities, and other offshore companies operating in Labuan were declared as non-residents for exchange control purposes. This initiative enabled these institutions to freely operate foreign currency accounts and move funds into and out of Malaysia without being subject to any exchange control monitoring. Licensed offshore banks were also permitted to accept deposits and grant loans in foreign currency. Investment guidelines were liberalized to allow Malaysian fund management companies to form joint ventures with foreign fund management companies. Management companies of unit trust funds located in Labuan were permitted to invest in Malaysian securities. A generous tax exemption was granted to companies incorporated in Labuan and their expatriate employees. By the end of 1996, 47 offshore banks, 5 offshore insurance and re-insurance companies, 13 trust companies, and 3 fund management companies had been incorporated in Labuan.
The ongoing process of capital account opening was temporarily halted in 1994 as the ringgit came under strong buying pressure as the booming economy created expectations about the currency's increasing strength. From late 1993 speculators brought ringgit in large amounts, increasing short-term deposits and forward transactions. In order to avoid an adverse effect on export competitiveness from a sharp exchange rate appreciation, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM, the Central Bank of Ma-laysia) imposed a number of restrictions on capital inºow during January-February 1994 (World Bank 1996 BNM 1999b, pp. 288-291 Notwithstanding signiªcant capital account opening since the mid 1980s, one important long-standing prudential regulatory instrument, namely restriction on foreign currency borrowing by private agents, was left intact. BNM continued to monitor foreign currency borrowings by residents and domestic borrowing by nonresidents under borrowing/lending ceilings stipulated in foreign exchange regulations. At the onset of the ªnancial crisis in mid 1997, the ceilings on foreign currency borrowing by residents and domestic currency borrowing by non-resident controlled companies stood respectively at 1 million and 10 million Malaysian ringgit (RM).
Capital ºows and signs of vulnerability
Foreign capital inºows to Malaysia have historically been dominated by FDI. 3 However, there was a signiªcant compositional shift in private capital inºows from about 1993. Capital market liberalization initiatives in Malaysia in the early 1990s coincided with the growing enthusiasm of hedge funds and other institutional investors for emerging-market economies (World Bank 1996) . Thus, there was a signiªcant increase in the net inºow of portfolio investment. These capital inºows, driven primarily by the boom in the Malaysian equity market, accounted for 45 percent of total annual capital inºows in 1996, up from 13 percent in the previous year. The volume of "volatile capital," deªned to cover both short-term borrowings and portfolio capital, had increased to sizable levels by the mid 1990s, resulting in an erosion of the authorities' ability to defend a speculative attack on the ringgit (Table  1) . 4 The degree of reserve cover provided for mobile capital declined from over 150 percent in the early 1990s to 57 percent by mid 1997.
Increased foreign equity investment fueled a massive stock market boom in Malaysia from the late 1980s. By the mid 1990s, with a market capitalization of around 35 
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Malaysian Capital Controls US$ 200 billion, the KLSE was the third largest stock market in the Asian and Paciªc region after those in Tokyo and Hong Kong, China. At this time, equity market capitalization in Malaysia was over 300 percent of GDP, by far the highest in the world. At the onset of the crisis, foreign investors accounted for only 30 to 40 percent of the activities in the market. However, the actual inºuence of foreign participation on the expansion and operation of the equity market was probably much greater than suggested by this ªgure because local investors always followed foreign investors as market leaders. The stock market boom had direct implications for the operation of the domestic banks; lending for equity market activities turned out to be a major source of bank credit expansion (discussed subsequently).
In sum, by the mid 1990s, Malaysia had become a depository for a substantial volume of volatile capital, in particular portfolio investment. The economy was experiencing an equity market bubble in which both foreign investors and domestic banks played crucial roles. In this context, there was a strong possibility of a reversal of capital inºows (triggered by a speculative attack on the currency, as in fact happened in the second half of 1997) to generate economic collapse through wealth contraction and banking sector instability. However, this possibility would not have translated into a ªnancial crisis had it not been for some serious pitfalls on the domestic policy front. Two fundamental sources of vulnerability were particularly important in the Malaysian case: poor corporate governance and weakness in the ªnancial sector (ªnancial fragility). 1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 c   Mobile capital, a US$ billion  6  7  12  24  28  32  38  51  Composition of mobile  capital( percent)   100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100   Short-term debt b  26  40  41  28  20  20  26  28  Banking sector  26  40  41  28  14  14  17  22  Non-bank private  0  0  0  0  6  6  8  6  Portfolio investment  74  60  59  72  80  80  74 In Malaysia, as in other crisis-affected countries in East Asia, the expansion of the equity market was not accompanied by initiatives to redress the underlying weaknesses of corporate governance (Searle 1999) . Most of the listed companies in Malaysia continued to be tightly controlled by a handful of powerful families. These families often retained majority stakes, even in public companies. Moreover, in many cases the interests of company bosses and politicians were closely interwoven. Manipulation of inter-company share transactions to augment proªt in privately owned companies (at the expense of listed companies) was a common occurrence in the Malaysian corporate world. Such malpractice made share trading vulnerable to ªnancial panic because unconnected (minority) shareholders had every reason to worry about how they would be treated during a market downturn.
Foreign investors were providing funds to Malaysian ªrms with high debt ratios and long-term alliance relationships, which would not have been acceptable in the West. The extent of subsequent portfolio capital outºows owed much to the realization that a large amount of capital should not have been committed in the ªrst place. When foreign participants started pulling out to avoid currency risk following the onset of the currency crisis in mid 1997, the local players panicked. Based on past experience, the minority shareholders were naturally concerned that they might be hardest hit in troubled times (The Economist 1997, p. 111).
The Malaysian banking system has historically been sturdier than its counterparts in most countries in the region. The average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of Malaysian banks (10 percent) was the highest in Southeast Asia other than Singapore. A large number of Malaysian banks recorded CARs of above 14 percent, as against 8 percent recommended by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). There was also a requirement that all banks set aside 1 percent of total outstanding loans as a general provision, in addition to speciªc provisions made for problem loans (1.5 percent). Nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the banking system fell from 5.5 percent in 1995 to 3.9 percent in 1996. Foreign currency exposure of the banking system remained low thanks to BNM's policy of specifying stringent net open positions on foreign borrowing. By mid 1997, the aggregate net open position (bank liabilities denominated in foreign currency net of equivalent assets) of the banking system was less than 5 percent of total bank liabilities (BIS 1998).
Despite this apparent soundness, in the lead-up to the crisis there was a heavy accumulation of outstanding domestic credits in the banking system, with a heavy exposure to the property sector (broadly deªned to include share trading and the real estate sector) (Soros 1998) . The rate of growth of bank credit to the private sector rose from 12 percent per annum during 1990-94 to over 26 percent during 1994-96. Out-standing credit as a ratio of GDP increased from an average level of 85 percent during 1985-89 to 120 percent in 1994 and then to over 160 percent when the ªnancial crisis broke in mid 1997. This was the highest credit buildup (increase in "private sector leverage") among the economies of East Asia (Athukorala and Warr 2002) .
By the end of 1996, total credit to the property sector accounted for around 40 percent of total outstanding bank credit. It is believed that this share could have been much higher (around 55 percent) if unclassiªed loans to conglomerates that are normally used to ªnance property were appropriately taken into account. The increased exposure to the property sector further weakened the ªnancial position of the banks as this lending led to a property glut in the country. By the end of 1997, more than 5.8 million square feet of new ofªce space was under construction in the Kuala Lumpur metropolis, on top of 5.6 million square feet of space available at the time (BNM 1999a).
The equity market bubble and the credit boom were underpinned by rapid erosion in the quality of macroeconomic management in the economy. Over many years (except during 1981-86 when Malaysia experienced a major macroeconomic crisis triggered by a public investment boom), the government had maintained a reputation for sound ªscal policies. However, the years following Prime Minister Mahathir's Vision 2020 Statement of 1990 saw ªscal excesses of increasing intensity. As a result of the "big growth push" to propel Malaysia to developed-country status by 2020, public investment expenditure surged, pushing the ratio of total investment to GDP to 46 percent in 1997, the highest in the region at the time. Much of this expenditure went into huge infrastructure development projects contracted out to private companies in the "patronage network" that provided the political support base for the regime. These companies soon became the dominant players in the equity market. The construction boom also contributed to the credit boom because the supply of "easy" credit from politically connected banks and other "captive" ªnancial institutions was an implicit condition built into the contractual arrangements with construction companies.
Rapid growth of government-sponsored bank lending invariably contributed to a weakening of the policy autonomy of BNM. Historically, BNM has maintained a reputation among the central banks in newly independent countries in the British Commonwealth for strict pursuance of the colonial mold of conservative monetary policy and banking regulation (Bruton 1993; Corden 2003) . However, in the context of a credit boom that had government backing at the highest political level, BNM had only a limited degree of freedom to take precautionary action against an impending crisis. BNM repeatedly pointed to the risk of rapid credit buildup with a heavy concentration in property and share trading loans in the banking system in 1994, 1995, and 1996 . However, it failed to take any action to redress the problem other than to impose some limits on lending to the property sector and for equity market dealings in March 1997.
Onset of the crisis, policy muddling through, and economic collapse
For over 5 years prior to the onset of the crisis, the exchange rate of the ringgit varied in the narrow range of 2.36 to 2.51 ringgit per U.S. dollar. When the Thai baht came under heavy speculative attack in mid May, the ringgit also experienced heavy selling pressure. BNM held the ringgit ªrmly through continued market intervention for another week and then gave way to market forces on 14 July by ºoating the currency. Between the ªrst week of July 1997 and 7 January 1998 when the currency slide hit bottom (MR 4.88/US$), the ringgit depreciated against the dollar by almost 50 percent. After showing some signs of stability during February and March, the exchange rate continued to deteriorate with wider swings in the following months (until it was ªxed at the rate of MR 3.80/US$). This contrasted with the experience of Thailand and Korea where exchange rates began to stabilize from March 1998.
As noted, Malaysia succumbed to the crisis with low foreign debt exposure compared to other crisis-hit countries in East Asia. Thus, unlike these countries, in Malaysia it was portfolio capital that accounted for virtually all the massive capital exodus. Net quarterly ºow of portfolio capital turned negative in the second quarter of 1997 for the ªrst time after 1991 and total net outºow in the next two quarters of the year amounted to over US$ 11 billion. By contrast, interestingly, net short-term bank borrowing increased by about US$ 3 billion during this period. Reºecting the massive reversal of portfolio capital ºows, the share market tumbled in tandem with the exchange rate collapse. Malaysia experienced the biggest stock market plunge among the ªve "crisis" countries in East Asia. By the end of 1997, the ordinary index of the KLSE had fallen by over 50 percent from its pre-crisis level, whipping off almost US$ 225 billion of share values. The price/earning (P/E) ratio of KLSE declined from 22.9 to 11.3 between these time points (Athukorala 1998 ).
Given the low foreign debt exposure, for a while the Malaysian policymakers were able to "muddle through" without an IMF-sponsored rescue package. 5 The immediate policy reaction to the currency collapse was to directly intervene in share market operation with a view to punishing speculators. On 27 August 1997, the KLSE banned the short-selling of 100 blue-chip stocks and rules were introduced to dis-courage the sale of stocks: sellers were required to deliver physical share certiªcates to their brokers before selling and the settlement period was reduced from 5 to 2 days. On 3 September 1997, the Prime Minister unveiled a plan to use funds from the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) to prop up share prices by buying stocks from Malaysian shareholders-but not foreigners-at a premium above prevailing prices. These moves backªred, triggering a massive sell-off of stocks in KLSE and undermining sentiment on other regional bourses. Ironically, the share purchases sponsored by the government were seen by market participants, both local and foreign, as an opportunity to get rid of Malaysian shares, rather than a reason for holding onto them. The ban on short-selling was lifted in early September 1997.
After more than 5 months of policy indifference, a major policy package involving signiªcant ªscal and monetary concretionary measures was announced by the then Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, on 5 December 1997. This policy, which was welcomed by the international ªnance community and labeled by the news media as "IMF policy without IMF," was however quickly abandoned, compounding policy uncertainty. BNM began to resort to expansionary policies to prevent "a recessiondeºation spiral" (BNM 1999a, p. 4) . Proposed cuts in government expenditures were restored and a number of large projects that had been put on hold were reactivated. By mid 1998 ªscal policy turned out to be more expansionary to compensate for the slack in private sector demand.
A National Economic Recovery Plan (NEAP) was launched on 23 July 1998 (NEAC 1998). It contained a comprehensive reform package encompassing signiªcant ªscal and monetary expansion, in a clear departure from the IMF-centered reform programs being implemented in the other crisis-hit countries in the region at the time. It also proposed setting up an institutional framework for recapitalizing the troubled banks and to resolve mounting corporate distress. Based on these proposals, an asset management company (Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhard, henceforth referred to as Danaharta) was set up to acquire and manage NPLs from banks. This was followed by the establishment in July of a banking and corporate recapitalization company (Danamodal Nasional Berhad, henceforth referred to as Danamodal) as a special agency with the purpose of recapitalizing those ªnancial institutions whose capital adequacy ratio had fallen below 9 percent. Finally, to complement the roles of Danaharta and Danamodal, a Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC, a joint public and private sector steering committee) was established in August 1998 to facilitate the restructuring of corporate debts through an out-ofcourt settlement between debtors and creditors. 6 The three institutions taken to-gether provided a systematic institutional framework (apparently designed with the involvement of reputable international consultancy ªrms) for addressing the bad debt problem of the ªnancial system and related corporate distress, which had already begun to emerge as major constraints on the recovery process.
The proposed banking and corporate restructuring programs were widely hailed by the ªnancial press as an important step in the right direction. But difªculties in obtaining the required funds precluded concrete policy action by these newly created institutions. A planned attempt to issue sovereign bonds in the United States and Europe to raise US$ 2 billion for implementing the banking-sector restructuring program had to be shelved in late August 1998. Thus, BNM had to continue to cushion the banking sector and debt-ridden companies against the liquidity squeeze caused by the share market crash and capital outºow by keeping a lid on interest rates and injecting liquidity into the system by printing money.
By August 1998, the economy was in recession and there were no signs of achieving currency and share price stability. The national account released in the last week of August revealed a contraction of output by 2.8 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively, in the ªrst two quarters. The number of retrenchments in domestic manufacturing jumped from 19,000 in 1997 to over 83,000 in 1998. The unemployment rate increased from 2.6 percent in 1996 to 3.9 percent in 1998. The inºation rate (measured by the consumer price index [CPI]) peaked at 6.2 percent in June, surpassing the previous peak of 5.3 percent recorded in 1991.
The combined outcome of economic collapse and the property market crash was a massive increase in non-performing loans in the banking system. This situation was further aggravated by a "ºight to quality" of deposits from smaller banks to large, well managed banks from the fourth quarter of 1997. The competition for funds by the affected institutions resulted in a sharp increase in lending rates (exceeding 20 percent in early 1998) in the banking sector as a whole. These higher lending rates in turn weakened banks' balance sheets by increasing the level of non-performing loans (BNM 1999b, p. 175) . According to BNM data, the proportion of nonperforming loans in total bank assets increased from about 2 percent in July to 3.6 percent in December 1997 and then to 11.8 percent in July 1998. Market analysts believed, however, that the problem was much more severe than the ofªcial ªgures suggested. This was because many companies had begun to roll over debt as part of their survival strategy. Independent estimates of the non-performing loan ratio ranged from 25 percent to 30 percent by mid 1998 (Heibert 1998; Financial Times, 22 August 1998; Soros 1998, p. 144) . Banks, because of the deterioration of balance sheets and/or because of over cautiousness in an uncertain ªnancial environment, tended to focus on loan recovery rather than issuing new loans. Consequently, credit contraction began to impact domestic consumption and investment. Falling asset prices created pressure on debtors, forcing them to distress sales of assets, which in turn led to further decline in asset prices.
Rapidly deteriorating investor conªdence was reºected in continued liquidation of shares by foreigners and capital ºight. A striking feature of capital ºights from Malaysia from about early 1998 was that they largely took the form of ringgit ºowing (rather than foreign currency) into Singapore. As much as 25 to 35 billion ringgit (US$ 6.3-8.8 billion), amounting to 40 to 60 percent of the total domestic money supply (M1), had ended up in Singapore at the height of the crisis in mid 1998 (IMF 1999b). These ºows were triggered by attractive money market rates of between 20-40 percent in Singapore, which provided a hefty premium over a domestic rate of about 11 percent coupled with a weakening exchange rate for the ringgit. Arbitrage between the two rates by money market dealers in both Singapore and Malaysia began putting pressure on the domestic interest rates in Malaysia. Thus policymakers became increasingly concerned about the "internationalization" of the national currency, which had carried a potential new threat to economic stability and monetary policy autonomy. The strong demand for offshore ringgit and the consequent buildup of offshore ringgit deposits increased the vulnerability of the ringgit, undermining the effectiveness of monetary policy (BNM 1999b, chapter 14; Hood 2001 ).
Capital-control based crisis resolution strategy
In this volatile economic climate, the Malaysian government had to choose between two alternatives. The ªrst was to obtain a "good housekeeping seal" on its policies from the IMF. As in Korea and Thailand, this would have stabilized the exchange rate, setting the stage for applying the Keynesian therapy to speed up the recovery. The second option was to resort to capital controls in order to combine a ªxed exchange rate with Keynesian policies, while ignoring vagaries of market sentiments.
By this time the IMF had signiªcantly changed its original strategy of "conªdence building through macroeconomic contraction" in favor of expansionary macroeconomic policy (Fisher 2004) . The four IMF program countries in the region-Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines-had already reformulated their policies along these lines with the blessing of the IMF. Thus if Malaysia's reluctance to seek IMF support was purely based on differences of opinion relating to macroeconomic policy, that constraint had become less binding by this time.
A widely expressed view in pro-government news commentaries in Malaysia at the time was that it was not eligible for IMF support even if it wanted to seek such sup-port because of its relatively strong balance of payments position and its relatively lower foreign debt (BNM 1999b, p. 5; NEAC 1998, p. 1) . However, this view is not consistent with the general IMF practice in assisting member countries in the event of an economic crisis and Malaysia's own economic conditions at the time. The Philippines, for example, was receiving ªnancing support from the IMF at the time, despite a relatively sound balance of payments position and much lower external debt burden compared to Thailand and Korea. In 1998, following a speculative attack on its currency (real) Brazil was able to obtain a backup credit line from the IMF (primarily as a means of regaining market conªdence), notwithstanding its sizable foreign exchange reserves (over US$ 40 billion) (Krugman 1999, p. 111) . Balance of payments need is only one of the eligibility criteria used by the IMF. In any case Malaysia's foreign exchange reserves were not extraordinarily high at the time (about US$ 15 billion, down from a pre-crisis level of US$ 25 billion). Therefore, if wanted, presumably Malaysia could have entered an IMF program.
The real issue was that this option was not politically acceptable to the Malaysian leadership. For over nearly 3 decades New Economic Policy (NEP) (renamed National Development Policy [NDP] in 2000)-perhaps the most comprehensive afªrmative action policy package ever implemented in any country in the world-has been central to the Malaysian economic policy (Snodgrass 1980) . Given the intimate links developed between business and government under this program, naturally the positive stabilizing impact of any policy move had to be weighed against its potential negative effect on socio-political stability of the country (Crouch 1998) . In his presidential address to the UMNO General Assembly on 19 June 1998, Prime Minister Mahathir summed up his position on this issue as follows:
[I]f we have to resort to the International Monetary Fund assistance . . . , the conditions imposed by the IMF will require us to open up our economy to foreigners. There will not be any Bumiputera quota as the New Economic Policy (NEP) is an injustice, and unacceptable to their liberal democracy (Mahathir 1998, p. 60-61) .
7 Political scientists will of course continue to debate on the relative importance of pure political motives compared to genuine economic policy considerations behind this policy shift (e.g., Haggard 2000; Jomo 2004 ). But the fact remains that Malaysia's social equilibrium is more fragile than that of the socially homogeneous countries like Thailand and Korea. There is little argument among informed Malaysian ob-servers that the afªrmative action policy enshrined in NEP had played a crucial role in the country's impressive economic success as against the generally dismal economic records of other heterogeneous, multiethnic nations in the developing world. In this context, Malaysian policymakers had a strong case to act on their own judgment of which approach to crisis management was in their best interest.
Confronted with this policy dilemma, the Malaysian leadership opted for the second alternative, ending the policy uncertainty that had pervaded the policy scene for almost a year. The linchpin of new policy was insulating the domestic ªnancial markets from short-term ªnancial ºows through capital controls. This was expected to set the stage for ªxing the exchange rate and provide breathing space for vigorous pursuance of monetary and ªscal expansion to ªght recession.
Although domestic considerations seem to have played the key role in this policy turnaround, the use of capital control to gain breathing space for crisis management had also begun to receive a measure of legitimacy in the international economic policy debate by this time. In particular, Krugman's (1998) controversial piece in Fortune (appearing two weeks before the announcement of Malaysia's new policy package), which speciªcally argued for using capital controls as a crisis management tool, received wide publicity in Malaysia. 8 There was also growing attention being paid to the newly emerging view that China and Taiwan, the two economies in the East Asian growth league with controls on short-term capital movements, fared much better than the rest of the region during the crisis. The recent experiences of countries like Chile and Slovenia in using capital controls to manage shorter-term capital inºows were cited often also in the media and government reports.
9
As a ªrst step, on 31 August 1998 offshore trading of shares of Malaysian companies was banned with immediate effect in a move to freeze over-the-counter share trading in the Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) market in Singapore. 10 This was fol-lowed by the imposition of comprehensive controls over short-term capital ºows (1 September 1998) and ªxed the exchange rate at RM 3.80/US$ (2 September 1998).
As BNM clearly stated in its policy announcement, the ªxing of the exchange rate was done while retaining the option of changing it when the underlying economic fundamentals changed. Although the new ªxed rate implied a mild appreciation of the ringgit from the average level for the previous 3 months (around RM 4.18), it represented a 35 percent depreciation against the pre-crisis levels of about RM 2.5.
The new capital controls banned trading in ringgit instruments among offshore banks operating in Malaysia and stopped Malaysian ªnancial institutions offering domestic credit facilities to non-resident banks and stockbrokers. With a view to stopping speculative trading in ringgit in overseas markets (predominantly in Singapore), the use of ringgit as an invoicing currency in foreign trade was banned with immediate effect and legal tender on all ringgit deposits held outside the country with effect from 30 September 1998. A 12-month withholding period was imposed on repatriation of proceeds (principal and proªt) from foreign portfolio investment. 11 The other measures included restrictions on overseas investment by residents exceeding RM 10,000 and a limit of RM 1,000 on Malaysian overseas travelers and stringent limits on the approval of foreign exchange for overseas travel and investment. A detailed listing of the new exchange control measures is provided in Appendix 2.
The controls were strong, but narrowly focused on short-term capital ºows. The aim was to make it harder for short-term portfolio investors, both foreign and local, to sell their shares and repatriate proceeds, and for offshore hedge funds to drive down the currency. With the exception of limits on foreign exchange for foreign travel by Malaysian citizens, there was no retreat from the country's long-standing commitment to an open trade and investment policy. No new direct controls were imposed on import and export trade. The controls were carefully designed to make it clear that the economy was not hostile to long-term foreign investment. Proªt remittance and repatriation of capital by foreign investors continued to remain free of 45 
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Malaysian Capital Controls side by side with the formal share market (Singapore Stock Exchange) in Singapore. At the time, total value of Malaysian shares traded in CLOB amounted to US$ 4.2 billion (Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 March, p. 56). Short-selling of shares continued on this market after such share dealings were made illegal in Malaysia following the onset of the crisis and this was perceived by policymakers in Malaysia as a major factor behind exchange rate and share price instability. CLOB trading was also thought to contribute to ringgit outºow to Singapore. Following the Malaysian move to ban offshore trading of Malaysian company shares, the CLOB market was closed on 15 September.
control. Immediately following the imposition of capital controls, BNM did experiment with new regulatory procedures in this area. But these were swiftly removed in response to protest by these ªrms. Moreover, some new measures were introduced to further encourage FDI participation in the economy. These measures included allowing 100 percent foreign ownership of new investment made before 31 December 2000 in domestic manufacturing regardless of the degree of export orientation; increasing the foreign ownership share in the telecommunication project from 30 percent to 69 percent (under the condition that the ownership share is brought down to 49 percent after 5 years), and in stock-brokering companies and insurance sector from a previous uniform level of 30 percent to 49 percent and 51 percent, respectively; and relaxing restrictions on foreign investment in real estate.
In early February 1999, the original 12-month holding restriction on portfolio investment was converted into a graduated exit levy. 12 Under this system, repatriation levies fell into one of two categories depending on whether the funds entered the country before or after 15 February 1999. For investments made before 15 February a three-tier levy was applied to the principal (the capital value) on how long the funds were retained in the country. For funds entered after 15 February there was a two-tier levy on the repatriation of proªts (but not on the principal): 30 percent on proªt made and repatriated within 1 year, and 10 percent on proªt repatriated after 1 year. In August 1999, the two-tier levy on proªt repatriation was replaced by a uniªed 10 percent levy. An agreement between the KLSE and the Singapore Stock Exchange reached on 26 February 2000 provided for the transfer of the shares trapped in the CLOB market to the Malaysian stock exchange, which allowed trading to resume. The 10-percent exit levy was lifted on 1 May 2001. Most of the newly introduced capital controls were relaxed and subsequently removed at successive stages during the next 2 years. The Malaysian authorities have, however, opted to retain some newly introduced restrictions on investment by offshore banks in ringgit-denominated assets and lending by ªnancial institutions to non-residents, albeit in a much more liberal fashion compared to those in the September 1998 package (Appendix 1). On 21 July 2005, the ringgit peg to the US$ was abolished in favor of a managed ºoating exchange rate system.
With the policy autonomy gained through the ªxed exchange rate and capital controls, the government swiftly embarked on a recovery package consisting of two key elements: macroeconomic stimulants, and banking and corporate restructuring. The 1999 Budget Speech presented (in October 1998) predicted an increase in the budget 46 
Malaysian Capital Controls deªcit from 1.8 percent of GNP in to 3.2 percent in 1999. The 2000 budget saw a further increase in the deªcit to 4.4 percent of GNP. On the expenditure side there were no major new proposals in both budgets beyond some moderate increase in funds earmarked for road and rail projects. On the revenue side there were signiªcant tax cuts and new tax incentives. Among them, the key element was a total waiver of income tax in 1999 and an across-the-board 1-percentage-point reduction in income tax rates proposed for 2000. There were also tax breaks for industries of national and strategic importance and an import duty reduction on machinery and equipment imports. The budget deªcits were ªnanced mostly through issuing Malaysian Government Securities (MGS), which were absorbed largely by provident, pension, and insurance funds. Only about one-third of the ªnancial needs have been raised externally, mainly from bilateral and multilateral sources.
To complement expansionary budgetary policy, BNM set on a course of monetary expansion. The statutory reserve requirement (SRR) ratio for banking institutions was cut at successive stages in order to inject liquidity into the debt-ridden banking system. By late 1998 the ratio had come down to 4 percent against a pre-crisis level of 13.5 percent. BNM also revised the formula used in computing the base-lending rate (BLR) 13 so that reductions in the intervention rate are better reºected in cost of bank credit. The margin that banks could charge their customers above the BLR was reduced from 4 percent to 2.5 percent. The 3-month inter-bank rate (BNM's policy rate on which other short-term interest rates are based), which was raised from 10 percent to 11 percent in February 1998 to defend the exchange rate, was reduced in a number of stages to 4 percent by early 1999. The default period for reclassiªca-tion of bank loans (which was reduced to 3 months from 6 months in January 1998) was changed back to 6 months, with a view to reducing the pressure on the banks to set aside capital against non-performing loans. The other measures introduced to boost credit expansion included an announcement on 9 September 1998 of an indicative annual loan growth target of 8 percent for commercial banks, relaxation of credit limits on lending by commercial banks and ªnancial companies for purchase of property and shares, a scheme for providing soft loans for purchase of cars, a special loan scheme for assisting smaller industries and low-income groups, and relaxing credit limits on credit cards (BNM 1999a).
The new policy package placed greater emphasis on the speedy implementation of the banking and corporate restructuring programs initiated in the ªrst half of 1998. The program involved carving out bad debt from the banking system by Danaharta injection of fresh capital through Danamodal and the CDRC. This well-conceived program remained virtually inactive until then because of difªculties involved in raising required funds. The new policy framework provided a conducive setting for raising required funds from domestic sources. In addition to the bad debt carving out and recapitalization schemes, BNM embarked on an ambitious merger program for domestic ªnance companies and banks, with a view to improving their competitiveness. The merger program for ªnance companies, which aimed at reducing the number of ªnance companies from 39 to less than half of the number through merger and/or amalgamation with banks, has already been completed. The banking merger program aimed to consolidate the nation's 58 ªnancial institutions into 6 (subsequently increased to 10) banking groups.
The recovery
The Malaysian economy experienced a 7.5 percent contraction in GDP in 1998, after 11 years of uninterrupted expansion averaging 8 percent per year. This was by far the worst downturn after World War II; GDP contracted by a mere 1 percent during the mid 1980s crisis. The degree of output contraction moderated to 1.3 percent (on an annual basis) in the ªrst quarter of 1999 followed by a positive growth rate of 4.1 percent in the second quarter. Recovery accelerated in the next two quarters, culminating in a growth rate of 5.4 percent for the whole year. The economy had regained the pre-crisis (1996) level of GDP by mid 2000, leaving behind almost 3 "lost" years of economic expansion (Table 2, Figure 1 ).
In line with strong recovery in domestic production, the employment situation improved. The unemployment rate in the economy by the end of 1999 stood at 3.4 percent, only 0.9 percentage points higher than the pre-crisis level (Table 3 ). The recovery was underpinned by remarkably low inºation, despite the heavy emphasis on ªscal and monetary expansion as part of the recovery strategy. The annual rate of consumer price inºation increased from 2.7 percent to 5.3 percent between 1997 and 1998. The rate of inºation measured in terms of the producer price index increased from 2.7 percent to 10.7 percent between 1997 and 1998 and then declined to 3.2 percent in 1999.
Growing business conªdence in the recovery process began to reºect in an impressive rebound in trading on the KLSE from mid 1999. The benchmark Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) had almost regained its pre-crisis (end of June 1997) level by the end of February 2000. Market capitalization of the KLSE increased from the historical low of RM 200 billion in August 1998 to over RM 700 billion in February 2000, which was only 5 percentage points short of the pre-crisis (June 1997) level. Table 3 . 
Note: a. All growth rates on a year-on-year basis. b. Sectoral share in GDP in 1996 are given in brackets. c. Based on manufacturing production index (1993 100). The weight attached to each category in the total index is given in brackets. d. Net of non-performing loans (6-month deªnition). e. End of period. f. End-of-the-year stock of outstanding loans deºated by the GDP deºator. g. Non-performing loans of commercial banks only. Based on a "6-month" non-performing period. h. Excluding gold reserves. -
Data not available. MIER Malaysian Institute of Economic Research
The consumer sentiment and business conªdence index of the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research regained the pre-crisis level by late 1999.
Public expenditure led the way to recovery. Following a 7.8 percent contraction in 1998, public consumption recorded double-digit growth from the ªrst quarter of 1999, contributing to over 70 percent of total consumption growth of 6.7 percent in that year. Public ªxed investment contracted by only 10 percent in 1998 compared to a 58 percent contraction in private ªxed investment. In 1999 the public ªxed investment expanded by 14 percent in a context of continued contraction in private investment (though at a lower rate), slowing contraction in total annual investment to 6 percent compared to 45 percent contraction in the previous year.
Private consumption was seen stabilizing in the ªrst half of 1999 and grew strongly in the second half of the year. In the ªrst quarter of 2000 private consumption grew by 14 percent, yielding a 12 percent expansion in total consumption despite a slowing down of public consumption to a mere 1 percent (compared to over 10 percent growth in the four previous quarters). Private investment continued to contract in 1999, albeit at a much slower rate (12 percent) compared to a massive contraction (57 percent) in the previous year, and began to recover from mid 2000.
On the production side, signs of recovery emerged ªrst in the services sectors (particularly in ªnancial services) and domestic-market oriented manufacturing. By the second quarter of 1999 recovery had become more broad-based, with exportoriented manufacturing playing a leading role. In 1999 and 2000 growth of exportoriented manufacturing was almost two times faster than domestic-oriented manufacturing. Of the total increment of manufacturing production during this period, 68 percent originated in export-oriented manufacturing. Of the total increment in GDP during this period, 70 percent came from the manufacturing sector, with almost 47 percent coming from export-oriented manufacturing alone. Thus, the Malaysian experience through the crisis is consistent with the conventional wisdom that greater export-orientation is an important facilitator of economic rebound following a crisis. However, in line with recovery in domestic demand, domesticoriented manufacturing also regained pre-crisis levels by 2000.
The agricultural sector (including forestry and ªshing) recorded negative growth in 1997 and 1998, reºecting world market conditions for the major primary export products (in particular rubber and palm oil), adding to the crisis-driven growth collapse. This sector began to record positive growth from the second quarter of 1999, underpinned by a sharp rebound in palm oil output from a decline of 8.3 percent in 1998 to an estimated increase of 19.4 percent in 1999. The mining sector, however, re-corded a marginal decline of 1.2 percent in 1999, reºecting a decline in domestic demand for gas in the depressed economy and some curtailment of crude oil production under the Government's National Depletion Policy.
The services sector grew by 6 percent in 1999, with all sub-sectors showing strong growth, reºecting across-the-board improvements in ªnal demand, in particular robust trade performance and strong recovery in consumer demand. The construction sector was the hardest hit by the crisis. In 1998 value-added in this sector contracted by a staggering 23.5 percent, accounting for over one-third of total GDP contraction (of 7.5 percent) in the year. Reºecting the severity of asset market collapse, the construction sector contracted by 23 percent in 1998 and the process of contraction continued well into the third quarter of 1999.
Although the initial impetus for recovery came from ªscal pump priming, over time the recovery has become increasingly private-sector led, with private consumption and net exports providing much of the stimulant for output growth. Thus, Malaysia had been able to ride the crisis without building up a massive debt overhang. The end-of-year stock public debt as a share of GDP increased from 32 percent in 1996 to 36 percent in 1998 and remained at around the same level in 1999 and 2000 (Table 3) . Almost 85 percent of the addition to total debt stock in 1998 and 1999 came from domestic borrowing. The share of foreign debt in the total stock did increase from 12 percent to 16.6 percent between 1996 and 1999. Much of foreign borrowing (over 80 percent), however, was long-term concessionary loans obtained from multilateral ªnancial organizations and foreign governments.
The turnaround in the economy was accompanied by a notable strengthening of the balance of payments position, driven by a more favorable external trade balance and signiªcant inºow of long-term capital. By the end of 1999 Malaysia's foreign exchange reserves stood at US$ 31 billion, and they provided 300 percent cover for total outstanding short-term debts and 200 percent cover for the stock of volatile capital (outstanding short-term debt ϩ cumulating portfolio investment, as deªned previously) of the country.
Have capital controls worked?
We observed in the previous section that the Malaysian economy recovered nicely following the introduction of the capital-control based reform package. But, precedent does not necessarily imply causation; the recovery could well have been the outcome of the working of natural market forces. Moreover, even if the controls were instrumental in engineering a rapid recovery this could have been at the ex-pense of long-term growth. In particular, capital controls could have had a longterm damaging effect on capital inºows, both FDI and portfolio capital, in particular the former, which have been a pivotal element of the country's pre-crisis economic dynamism. Inept practices (e.g., helping cronies) as part of the banking and corporate restructuring operations undertaken under the cover of capital controls could have resulted in costly resource misallocation.
Capital controls and economic recovery
A number of observers have attempted to understand the role of capital controls in Malaysia's recovery from the crisis through simple comparisons of sources of vulnerability and recovery experiences of crisis-hit countries using readily available performance indicators (Hiebert 1999; IMF 1999b; Lim 1999; Miller 1999; Dornbusch 2002) . These comparisons have led to two common inferences. The ªrst is that Malaysia did not have a crisis in the ªrst place, it was an innocent victim of speculative capital exodus and the economy would have recovered swiftly with the help of the standard market-friendly policies. The inference is that capital controls did not make a "distinct" contribution to the recovery process in Malaysia. At the time Malaysia made the policy U-turn, capital had already left the country and speculative pressure for capital outºow from the Asian region was coming to an end. So the imposition of capital controls was simply a ritualistic locking of the barn door after the horse was stolen. More speciªcally, it is emphasized that not only Malaysia but also the other crisis-hit Asian countries, which maintained open capital accounts throughout under IMF-centered reform packages, began to recover at about the same time.
But these views ignore the important fact that the economies under consideration are vastly different in terms of the sources of vulnerability to the crisis, and the nature of the economic structure, which determine ºexibility of adjustment to a crisis. Put simply, details differ in important ways from one country to another, and readily available performance indicators do not capture these differences (Cooper 1998; Corden 2003, chapter 11; Eichengreen 2003, chapter 9) . The view that Malaysia did not have a crisis to warrant a drastic policy U-turn is primarily based on the relatively low levels of foreign debts and non-performing loans in the Malaysian banking system at the onset of the crisis. This view ignores the explosive mix of share market bubble and domestic credit boom that had developed in Malaysia in the lead-up to the crisis (Athukorala 2002 ). 14 Be that as it may, there is no logic behind the argument that the severity of a speculative attack on the currency of a country is proportional to the degree of vulnerability. If foreign lenders suspect an impending crisis, they do not expect to be told how serious the problem may become. They will simply withdraw their funds as rapidly as possible, thus turning a suspected ªnancial problem into a ªnancial rout (Cooper 1998) . Given these considerations, an inter-country comparison can yield meaningful inferences only if economic adjustment under alternative policies is studied carefully while placing emphasis on fundamental differences in economic structures and original sources of vulnerability to the crisis.
The "barn door" analogy misses the point that the purpose of capital control was to set the stage for monetary and ªscal expansion by preventing outºow of funds, both local and foreign-owned, in response to lowering the domestic interest rate relative to world market rates under the new expansionary macroeconomic policy stance. In any case, the available performance indicators are not consistent with the view that Malaysia has lagged behind the recovery process compared to the IMF-program countries. Whereas all these countries started to show signs of recovery from about late 1998, among the three countries under consideration only Korea has so far recorded a faster recovery rate than Malaysia. But Korea is a mature industrial nation with a diversiªed manufacturing base. Moreover, the dominant role played by a few national companies (chaebols) in manufacturing production and trade seems to have placed Korea in a uniquely advantageous position in the recovery process (Booth 1999; Corden 2007) . In terms of the stage of development and the nature of the economic structures, undoubtedly the better comparator for Malaysia is Thailand.
So far, Malaysia's recovery rate has been much faster and steadier compared to Thailand ( Table 2) . The difference between the recovery experiences of the two countries becomes even more signiªcant when one goes beyond the aggregate GDP growth ªgure and looks at other performance indicators. For instance, even by the mid 2000 recovery in the Thai economy, Thailand continued to rely on massive public sector demand, with private consumption remaining well below pre-crisis levels. By contrast in Malaysia the recovery process had become broad-based by late 1999, with rapid recovery in private sector consumption and investment. Unlike Malaysia, problems in the ªnancial sector still remained a major source of uncertainty in Thailand. Even by early 2000, the NPL ratio of the Thai ªnancial system continued to remain stubbornly high (nearly 40 percent), and the volume of real outstanding credit was still falling. Reºecting mostly continuing ªnancial sector weaknesses, recovery of the share market in Thailand began to falter from about early 2000, compared to an impressive continuing recovery of the Malaysian share market. As a re-sult of share-market related capital outºows, Thailand's foreign reserve levels had begun to be depleted by this time, causing policy concerns about the sustainability of recovery (Siamwalla 2000) . Kaplan and Rodrik (2002) examine whether the choice of the capital-control based crisis management route versus the conventional IMF recipe made a difference to the recovery process in Malaysia. They compare economic performance in Malaysia during 12 months following the radical policy shift with performances in Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia during the 12 months after each country began to implement an IMF-assisted crisis management package. Their results, derived by applying the time-shifted difference-in-difference regression methodology to monthly data on a number of key variables including industrial production, manufacturing employment, real wages, stock market indices, and foreign reserves, are consistent with the view that the Malaysian recovery experience under capital controls was superior to that of the three IMF-program countries. This ªnding is, however, dictated by the choice of the particular counterfactual (that is, performance of the other three countries during the ªrst year immediately after choosing the IMF route) for the econometric test. When the test is recast to examine how Malaysia performed relative to the other three countries during the same period after the imposition of capital controls in Malaysia, "capital controls look bad" (p. 429). The authors maintain that the counterfactual used in the former comparison is the valid one because by September 1998 Malaysian policies had become unsustainable and the realistic alternative to capital controls was an IMF program of the type that other countries had already undertaken. However, one can argue that the choice of this counterfactual would have stacked the deck in favor of Malaysian capital controls; various developments in the international economic environment (such as the sharp cut in the U.S. Federal Reserve interest rates and improved world demand conditions faced by some key export products (in particular electronics from countries in the region) had begun to aid the recovery process in all crisis-hit East Asian economies from mid 1998 (Rojas-Suarez 2002).
Economists will continue to debate whether the Malaysia recovery record under capital controls was superior to that of the IMF-program countries. But there is little justiªcation for using the "superiority" yardstick in examining the outcome of the Malaysian experiment and making inferences about the suitability of capital controls as a crisis resolution strategy-failing an early and gracious arrival of the IMF and/or socio-political resistance to going along the IMF path. As we have already noted, the September policy U-turn in Malaysia was basically a policy choice made in desperation. There is no evidence to suggest that Malaysian policymakers antici-pated this move to generate a superior outcome. Moreover, the almost unanimous view of the critics at the time was that Malaysia's non-conventional approach was doomed to fail. The appropriate question is therefore whether this unorthodox policy shift was a viable alternative strategy for Malaysia to recover from the crisis. In the remainder of this section we attempt to broaden our understanding of this issue by probing how capital controls were instrumental in achieving this recovery. Our approach is to examine whether the original expectations (mostly negative) about the fate of the reform program were in fact consistent with the actual experience.
Policy autonomy A major doubt about the effectiveness capital controls as a crisis management tool relates to presumably ample scope for avoidance and evasion, which can simply negate the expected monetary policy autonomy (Hale 1998; Edwards 1999) . The general argument here is that, the more extensive trade and investment links are, the more difªcult and costly it is to control capital account transactions because of the multiplication in the number of arbitrage possibilities that arise in the course of normal business. The problem with this argument is that it is based on a misleading mixing of "placing funds abroad retail" [retail transfer of funds abroad] by manipulating current account transactions and "exporting capital wholesale" (Williamson 1993, p. 36) . There is ample evidence from both developed and developing countries that capital controls are in fact effective in substantially reducing, if not preventing, capital ºows of the latter type, in particular placement abroad of institutional savings (Radelet and Sachs 1998; Larrain and Laban 2000; Eichengreen 2003 ). The evidence from capital controls in Malaysia is consistent with this evidence.
Controls seem to have helped lowering interest rates and are encouraging a revival of domestic consumption and investment without precipitating capital ºights. Unlike the situation before the imposition of capital controls, short-term capital ºows stabilized in the ªrst quarter of 1998. Therefore, the foreign reserve position began to improve in tandem with the surplus in the current account. Total foreign exchange reserves, which remained around US$ 20 billion from the third quarter of 1997, surpassed the pre-crisis level of US$ 30 billion by the end of 1999. The "errors and omission" item in the balance of payments, which is widely considered to be a convenient indicator of "unofªcial" capital ºows, in fact shrank following the imposition of capital controls. As foreign exchange controls were targeted carefully on short-term investment ºows, and trade-and FDI-related transactions continued to remain liberal, the policy shift did not result in the emergence of a black market for foreign exchange.
The effectiveness of capital controls in bringing in expected monetary policy autonomy is evident from the dramatic turnaround in the differential between domestic and international interest rates in Malaysia following the imposition of these controls ( Figure 2 ). The differential remained positive and varied in the range of 0.6 percent to 2 percent during the period before the onset of the crisis. Then it increased reaching a peak of 8 percent at the height of the crisis in mid 1998. Following the imposition of capital controls in September 1998, it tended to decline, entering the negative territory by March 1999. From then the differential has remained around Ϫ2.5 percent with little monthly ºuctuations. Both the dramatic decline in the differential and its remarkable stability in recent months clearly attest to the effectiveness of controls in insulating the domestic interest rate from international ªnancial market developments. This inference (based on simple visual inspection of relative movement in interest rates) is supported strongly by systematic econometric analyses of Edison and Reinhart (2000) , Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001), and Doreisami (2004) .
Banking and corporate restructuring The breathing space provided by capital controls, exchange rate stability, and the resultant monetary policy autonomy were instrumental in the speedy implementation of banking and corporate restructuring. Many feared that under the Danaharta/Danamodal program bailing out of the wellconnected would come at the expense of the poor and the middle class using the printing press backed by capital controls. This suspicion has given way to a virtual general consensus among the Malaysian observers that the shelter has been successfully used to implement the most effective and far-reaching ªnancial system cleanup among the crisis countries. The program is considered to have been more effective and fair than many of similar efforts in the region, notably those of Thailand and Indonesia but also that of Korea (Ogus 2000) . The IMF, in its 1999 Public Information Notices on recent Article IV Consultation with Malaysia, commended the Malaysian authorities for "using the breathing space [provided by the policy measures introduced in September 1998 ] to push ahead with a well-designed and effectively implemented strategy for ªnancial sector restructuring" (IMF 1999a , IMF 2000 . The Economist, in a dramatic reversal from previous pessimistic views, recently commended the Malaysian banking and corporate restructuring:
In Malaysia there are doubts about the government's handling of debtors; wellconnected ones have emerged in better shape than some analysts think they should have done. But the government's success in holding down the level of bad debts, and in cleaning up the ones that did emerge, has been undeniable. That is one reason why Malaysia's short-term prospects are so good (The Economist, 2000, p. 74) .
By mid 2000 Danaharta had successfully carved out bad debts to the tune of US$ 12 billion or 42.2 percent of total NPLs of the entire banking system. Through operation of Danamodal, the capital base of the banking system had been raised well above the international BIS requirement. The Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee had resolved bad debt problems of 25 ªrms with loans totaling US$ 4.7 billion, and was resolving another 26 cases with debt amounting to US$ 4.3 billion. As a result of the support provided by low interest rates and rapid recovery in containing NPL growth, performance of the banking and corporate sectors improved at a faster rate than originally envisaged. Consequently, Danamodal required considerably less funding than originally envisaged. Danaharta had ceased purchasing non-performing loans by mid 2000 and entered the workout phase of managing the acquired assets.
The carving out of bad debts and the recapitalization of weak banks was instrumental in avoiding contraction in bank lending (Figure 3 ). This seems to have been a factor behind the broad-based recovery. A moribund credit market essentially constrains recovery by discouraging creditworthy businesses who would have been willing to spend more if they had access to credit. Moreover, as Kruger and Tornell (1999) have demonstrated in the context of the Mexican economy following the 1994 crisis, a continuing credit crunch caused by delayed banking restructuring could act as a major constraint on ªrms in the non-traded-goods sectors, which are normally the most affected by the crisis, and small ªrms in traded-goods sector, which normally do not have favored access to limited domestic lending sources or to foreign borrowing despite improved proªtability of operation. This resulted in a lopsided recovery process involving predominantly traded-goods industries dominated by large (mostly export-oriented) ªrms. Malaysia seems to have avoided this "Mexican syndrome" through early action in the sphere of banking restructuring.
Impact on FDI and other growth implications
Many commentators expressed fear that capital controls would hamper the economic recovery by adversely affecting FDI in Malaysia (Hale 1998; Hill 1998; Hiebert 1999; Miller 1999) . It was argued that this signiªcant departure from Malaysia's long-standing commitment to economic openness could certainly have an adverse impact on the general investment climate of the country. Moreover, in Malaysia, the decision to impose controls appeared so sudden and arbitrary that it called into question the general credibility of the government's whole framework for foreign investment. The pessimistic view was based on a false aggregation of FDI with portfolio investment and short-term bank credits. It ignored the time-honored dictum in the balance of payments theory that, "in terms of underlying determinants of mobility, FDI is quite different from hot money" (Meade 1951, p. 298 determined by long-term considerations governing international production decisions of MNEs, not by ªnancial panics and related short-term economic changes, which underpin hot money movement. Therefore, regarding a country's external economic policy, what is primarily important for attracting FDI is a ªrm commitment to the maintenance of an open current account (Bhagwati 1998) .
Was the continuity of the impressive record of Malaysia as a favored host of FDI broken by the capital controls? Net FDI ºows to Malaysia declined from US$ 7.9 billion in 1996 to US$ 3.0 billion in 1998. During the ensuing 6 years the average level of net annual inºows amounted to only 55 percent of that during 1990-95. It could well be that the prolonged period of policy and political uncertainty following the onset of the crisis, and widespread market scepticism about the fate of Malaysia's unorthodox reform package introduced in September 1998, may have played a role. However, Malaysia's post-crisis record of attracting FDI has been comparable to, if not more impressive, compared to Thailand (Figure 4) . Only Korean has maintained a superior record. But one should be cautious in deriving inferences from a comparison of Malaysia's post-crisis FDI experience with that of Korea (or Thailand) for a number of reasons. First, the FDI series (derived from balance of payments accounts) depicted in Figure  4 provide only partial coverage of FDI in these countries. According to the standard deªnition, FDI has three components: equity capital, inter-company debt, and reinvested earnings. As in many other countries, data series on FDI in these countries capture only equity capital and inter-company debt. The omission of the third component (retained earnings) can lead to an underestimation of the actual magnitude of FDI in a given host country depending on the history of MNE involvement and the source country proªle of FDI. 15 The degree of underestimation could well be greater for Malaysia and its long history as an attractive destination of FDI.
Second, in Thailand and Korea acquisition by foreign companies of assets or equity of domestic companies has been an important component of foreign capital inºows during this period (Table 4) . Despite the severity of the downturn, corporate distress was far less widespread in Malaysia than elsewhere, and there were simply fewer "bargain assets" for mergers and takeovers. Moreover, unlike Korea and Thailand, Malaysia did not resort to promoting acquisition and takeovers by foreign companies as part of the ongoing process of corporate and banking restructuring. During 1998-00, capital inºows relating to mergers and acquisitions amounted to US$ 20.5 billion in Korea (203 percent of total net FDI inºows) and US$ 7.7 billion (50 percent) in Thailand, compared to US$ 2.7 billion (17.2 percent) in Malaysia. 16 It is also important to note that, accordingly to the FDI classiªcation system adopted by BNM in its balance of payments account, "purchase of existing plant and equipment" by foreigners is treated as "changes of ownership" not as "new investment." Table 5 .5). Thus the post-crisis increase in FDI in the former countries compared to Malaysia may, to a signiªcant extent, reºect "catching-up" entry by foreign ªrms following the new FDI liberalization initiatives. Third, in the immediate pre-crisis years, intra-regional inºows (particularly from Korea and Taiwan) accounted for over one-third of total FDI inºows to Malaysia. These ºows dwindled following the onset of the crisis.
Portfolio investment
Have portfolio investors deserted Malaysia as a punishment for its recalcitrant act? This question is important because, despite the disruptive role they played in the onset of the crisis, foreign portfolio inºows have important positive effects, when harnessed in an appropriate macroeconomic setting. They contribute to expansion in domestic investment by reducing cost of equity capital and helping ªrms to reduce their reliance on bank-based ªnancial intermediation (Williamson 1999) .
When the capital controls were ªrst introduced (and even after the new levy was introduced on 15 February) many observers were concerned about potential massive outºows of short-term foreign debt and portfolio investment after 1 September 1999. However, the ending of the 1-year moratorium turned out to be a non-event.
Total net portfolio capital outºow in the fourth quarter of 1999 amounted to only US$ 2.2 billion, compared to a total stock of about US$ 10 billion potentially movable foreign portfolio investment remained in the country at the time the restriction was lifted (IMF 1999a, p. 98) . Net outºows turned out to be positive by mid January 2000 and the ªrst quarter of the year recorded a total net inºow of US$ 2.4 billion. This investment pattern suggests that investors do not ªnd it difªcult to factor in the new proªt tax on portfolio investment, as ground rules are now more transparent in a context where signs of economic recovery are already clearly visible. The resurgence of portfolio ºows also may be because new inexperienced investors replace the ones who have been buried, or because memories of all investors are generally short (DeLong 1999). growth prospects of the economy will remain intact. Alternatively, if bailouts assisted inefªcient (mostly politically linked) ªrms whose insolvency hastened by the high interest rates and lower aggregate demand, then growth prospects would have been impaired. Such rescue operation may also induce moral hazard by encouraging ªrms/banks to continue engaging in risky acts, in the hope that they will be rescued in the event of similar future crises.
There is indeed anecdotal evidence of inappropriate rescue operations (Ariff 1999; Yap 2001 ). Signiªcant differences in discount rates applied to various assisted banks by Danahartha remain unexplained. Similarly, the criteria used by Danamodal in its decisions as to which banks should be given priority in injecting capital remain largely unexplained. But whether these opaque practices are unique to the capitalcontrol based crisis management in Malaysia is a debatable issue. Similar concerns have been raised relating to banking and corporate restructuring processes in Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia-countries that are riding the crisis without capital controls. Moreover, one can reasonably argue (along the lines of Krueger and Tornell 1999, for instance) that economic gains associated with the speedy implementation of banking and corporate restructuring in Malaysia might have compensated signiªcantly, if not totally, for these alleged costs.
Concluding remarks
Given the Malaysian policymakers' reluctance to an IMF-sponsored reform process, which was rooted in the country's policy history, the capital control-based crisis resolution policy package was a logical policy choice. Once the Malaysian authorities decided to deviate from the IMF route and follow the conventional Keynesian recipe for crisis management, capital controls seems to have provided a conducive setting for the effective pursuance of such policies. The new policy prevented massive capital outºow and permitted sustaining signiªcant interest rate differential with the rest of the world. Against the popular perception that short-term capital ºows cannot be controlled in an economy that is highly integrated in the global economy, the Malaysian evidence suggests that this can in fact be effectively done (at least on the margin)-provided the controls are speciªcally targeted at short-term capital transactions and are forcefully implemented. The ªxed exchange rate has helped the recovery process by preventing premature exchange rate appreciation as part of improved market sentiments about the recovery prospects.
There is no evidence to suggest that controls on short-term capital ºows have adversely affected Malaysia's image as a favorable location for FDI. The time-honored (and yet much-neglected in the current debate on crisis management) dictum that the long-term investment is determined by quite different factors compared to "hot money" movements is reconªrmed by the Malaysian experiment. Nor have foreign portfolio investors permanently deserted Malaysia as a punishment for the restraints imposed on them during the crisis. Here, the lesson is that the use of capital control is unlikely to have an adverse lingering effect on foreign portfolio investment, provided timely steps are taken to infuse greater ºexibility and transparency to the regulatory mechanism and the reform process brings about speedy economic recovery and the controls are implemented in a transparent fashion strictly in line with the original plan.
One can still dispute the argument that controls have played a special role in delivering a superior recovery outcome for Malaysia (compared to the IMF-program countries) for want of counterfactuals. However, the fact remains that the new policy measures enabled Malaysia to achieve recovery while minimizing social costs and economic disruptions associated with a more market-oriented path to reform. This is a signiªcant achievement because maintaining social harmony is an overriding concern (quite apart from economic efªciency consideration) of economic policymaking in ethnically diverse Malaysia. Even if the bloody racial riots in Kuala Lumpur in 1969 are ignored as a distant event, the imminent ethnic conºict brought about by the modest economic downturn in Malaysia in the mid 1980s cannot be entirely overlooked.
There is indeed anecdotal evidence of inappropriate rescue operations. But whether these costly practices are unique to the capital-control based crisis management in Malaysia is a debatable issue. Moreover, one can reasonably argue that economic gains associated with the speedy implementation of banking and corporate restructuring in Malaysia might have compensated signiªcantly, if not totally, for these alleged costs.
It is pertinent to end this paper with an important caveat. The inference that capital controls have helped crisis management in Malaysia by no means implies that Malaysia's radical policy shift should be treated as a ready-made alternative to the conventional IMF recipe by other developing countries. It is of course hazardous to draw general policy lessons from the study of an individual country case. With the beneªt of hindsight, one can reasonably argue that a number of factors speciªc to Malaysia as well as to the timing of policy reforms may have signiªcantly conditioned the actual policy outcome.
Thanks to long-standing prudential controls on foreign borrowing, Malaysia succumbed to the crisis with limited foreign debt exposure. With a vast domestic reve-nue base and ready access to "captive" domestic ªnancial sources (in particular the Employees Provident Fund [EPF] and the oil-rich Petronas), the Malaysian government was relatively better positioned than perhaps any other crisis country to make a decisive departure from the conventional, IMF-centered approach to crisis management. Additionally, the implementation of new controls was aided greatly by a well-developed banking system, which was able to perform most of the new functions smoothly in the normal course of their business. In the management of the controls it also helped that Malaysia had both a disciplined banking system and a competent central bank. Not all countries are so blessed.
The imposition of capital controls coincided with a signiªcant upturn in manufactured exports (mostly as a result of dramatic recovery in the world electronics trade). Therefore there was no shortage of foreign exchange. The particular exchange rate parity, presumably chosen arbitrarily by the Malaysian policymakers, eventually turned out to be a highly realistic rate, as the market panic against Asian economies began to subside and the yen began to appreciate against the U.S. dollar. Given the availability of ample foreign exchanges for trade and FDI-related activities at a realistic exchange rate there was no panic buying leading to foreign exchange manipulation. Any policy inference from the particular Malaysian experience needs to be appropriately qualiªed for these speciªc circumstances.
